Lord Cadillac
08-08-09, 12:51 AM
Legends of the Fall: The Cadillac Allante, The Buick Reatta, and How GM Lost Its Styling Mojo
LINES OF SUCCESSION
In 1977, GM Design vice president Bill Mitchell reached the age of 65 and followed his legendary predecessor, Harley Earl, into mandatory retirement. Although he never enjoyed the power that Earl once commanded, Mitchell was a formidable presence within General Motors. Sharp-tongued and deeply stubborn, Mitchell feared no one, and his ferocious temper was well known. He was not an easy man for GM management to live with, but he continuing the styling leadership that Earl had established back in the 1930s. Mitchell played no small part in maintaining GM's U.S. market share, which in the year of his retirement was close to 50%.
Mitchell's chosen successor was Charles M. Jordan, who had been his design director since July 1959. Chuck Jordan joined General Motors in the late 1940s, becoming head of the Cadillac styling studio in 1958. On Mitchell's orders, he spent the late sixties as head of GM's German Opel division, where he was responsible for the Opel GT and Opel Manta coupe. Like Mitchell, Jordan had strong design skills matched by an equally strong temper. Stylist Stan Wilen, who worked with him for years, said, "Chuck could be arrogant and sometimes downright brutal. I had to separate him once from a union shop foreman... They were actually going to duke it out." Wilen called Jordan "a natural leader," but his outbursts had made him many enemies within the GM hierarchy.
GM management was also weary of Mitchell. Mitchell's many faults -- which included serious drinking and egregious sexual harassment -- were tolerated grudgingly because of his obvious value to the company. No one was enthusiastic about allowing his replacement to be more of the same. Moreover, Howard Kehrl, GM's executive vice president, held a personal grudge against Jordan over several past confrontations.
In July 1977, the selection committee bypassed Jordan and named Irv Rybicki as the new design VP. Rybicki had been Mitchell's chief assistant, with stints in all the design studios except Buick. Although Chuck Jordan was almost universally acknowledged as the better designer, Rybicki was far more congenial: even-tempered, fair, objective, and in all respects a team player. He was the antithesis of Mitchell and Jordan in personality, which was exactly what the selection committee wanted.
Although Jordan responded to the news with a tantrum -- after unenthusiastically shaking Rybicki's hand, he stormed out and drove away in a rage -- Rybicki was subsequently persuaded (possibly by Mitchell) to make him his design director. It was an uneasy arrangement. Jordan had previously been Rybicki's boss, and he was bitter at being passed over. The two were often at cross-purposes, undermining each other's authority and leaving their staff unsure which way to turn.
BUICK MAKES A MOVE
While this drama unfolded in the Design Center, at Buick headquarters in Flint, a different struggle was taking place. Chief engineer Lloyd Reuss had recognized that Buick's traditional upper-middle-class market was increasingly threatened by overseas rivals like BMW and Audi. While those European competitors were significantly more expensive than Buick -- more in Cadillac's price territory -- they were winning the hearts and minds of the kind of affluent customers who had once been Buick stalwarts. Reuss pushed to transform Buick's increasingly geriatric image, introducing a new line of turbocharged V6 engines (which culminated in the muscular Grand Nationals of the 1980s). He and product planner Jay Qualman also began work on a sporty, two-place Buick, the first Buick two-seater since before the war. It was intended as a statement of intent that Buick was no longer content to be an old man's car. "We wanted an upscale, sportier image," Reuss recalled. "Call it 'sporty elegance.'"
In 1977, there were serious discussions about creating a two-seat "L-body" coupe for Buick and Oldsmobile, based on the upcoming J-body sedans. The L-body project was stillborn, however, when it became clear that to make business sense, the two versions would need a combined annual volume of at least 100,000 units, which was wildly unrealistic. In 1978, Reuss departed to become chief engineer for Chevrolet, and the project collapsed.
They didn't forget about the idea, however, and when Reuss returned to Buick in 1980 as general manager, Jay Qualman -- now product planning chief -- brought up the two-seater idea again. This time, he suggested basing it on the new downsized FWD E-body (Buick Riviera/Cadillac Eldorado/Oldsmobile Toronado), then in development. Qualman and Lynn Salata, Buick's strategic planning manager, concluded that such a car could be profitable at a volume of 22,000 units a year, with very low investment costs.
Reuss pitched the idea to GM president Jim McDonald in the summer of 1981. Proclaiming excitedly, "Finally, someone has figured out how to make money on a two-seater," McDonald declared that the division that really needed a luxury two-seater was Cadillac.
THE PININFARINA PROBLEM
By early 1982, Cadillac had started work on the "Callisto" project, eventually renamed Allanté. Like Reuss's proposed Buick two-seater, it would be based mechanically on the FWD E-body, but it was to be a roadster, aimed directly at the Mercedes SL. To add to its cachet, it was decided early on that the Callisto/Allanté should be styled in Europe, by the prestigious design firm Pininfarina.
That decision did not sit well with Irv Rybicki, Chuck Jordan, or anyone in the Design Staff. They protested angrily, particularly when they learned that Pininfarina would also be contracted to build the bodies, as well as just designing them. "The chief [Cadillac] designer, Wayne Kady, was walking around with a frown," Rybicki recalled. "I thought, win, lose, or draw, I've got to give these fellows a shot at the program, even though the decision might have been made that Pininfarina is going to do it." At his insistence, Design got a few months to put together a competing proposal.
It was a wasted effort. According to Wayne Kady, senior management "looked at ours next to theirs as a courtesy, but they had made up their minds." Rybicki was told, "Irv, regardless of how much better your car may look than the one that Sergio [Pininfarina] is doing, we're going to select his because we believe if it's his design, he'll do a better job of engineering and fabrication and build a quality into it that's necessary."
Read more... (http://ateupwithmotor.com/model-histories/sports-cars-and-muscle-cars/165-legends-of-the-fall-buick-reatta.html/)
LINES OF SUCCESSION
In 1977, GM Design vice president Bill Mitchell reached the age of 65 and followed his legendary predecessor, Harley Earl, into mandatory retirement. Although he never enjoyed the power that Earl once commanded, Mitchell was a formidable presence within General Motors. Sharp-tongued and deeply stubborn, Mitchell feared no one, and his ferocious temper was well known. He was not an easy man for GM management to live with, but he continuing the styling leadership that Earl had established back in the 1930s. Mitchell played no small part in maintaining GM's U.S. market share, which in the year of his retirement was close to 50%.
Mitchell's chosen successor was Charles M. Jordan, who had been his design director since July 1959. Chuck Jordan joined General Motors in the late 1940s, becoming head of the Cadillac styling studio in 1958. On Mitchell's orders, he spent the late sixties as head of GM's German Opel division, where he was responsible for the Opel GT and Opel Manta coupe. Like Mitchell, Jordan had strong design skills matched by an equally strong temper. Stylist Stan Wilen, who worked with him for years, said, "Chuck could be arrogant and sometimes downright brutal. I had to separate him once from a union shop foreman... They were actually going to duke it out." Wilen called Jordan "a natural leader," but his outbursts had made him many enemies within the GM hierarchy.
GM management was also weary of Mitchell. Mitchell's many faults -- which included serious drinking and egregious sexual harassment -- were tolerated grudgingly because of his obvious value to the company. No one was enthusiastic about allowing his replacement to be more of the same. Moreover, Howard Kehrl, GM's executive vice president, held a personal grudge against Jordan over several past confrontations.
In July 1977, the selection committee bypassed Jordan and named Irv Rybicki as the new design VP. Rybicki had been Mitchell's chief assistant, with stints in all the design studios except Buick. Although Chuck Jordan was almost universally acknowledged as the better designer, Rybicki was far more congenial: even-tempered, fair, objective, and in all respects a team player. He was the antithesis of Mitchell and Jordan in personality, which was exactly what the selection committee wanted.
Although Jordan responded to the news with a tantrum -- after unenthusiastically shaking Rybicki's hand, he stormed out and drove away in a rage -- Rybicki was subsequently persuaded (possibly by Mitchell) to make him his design director. It was an uneasy arrangement. Jordan had previously been Rybicki's boss, and he was bitter at being passed over. The two were often at cross-purposes, undermining each other's authority and leaving their staff unsure which way to turn.
BUICK MAKES A MOVE
While this drama unfolded in the Design Center, at Buick headquarters in Flint, a different struggle was taking place. Chief engineer Lloyd Reuss had recognized that Buick's traditional upper-middle-class market was increasingly threatened by overseas rivals like BMW and Audi. While those European competitors were significantly more expensive than Buick -- more in Cadillac's price territory -- they were winning the hearts and minds of the kind of affluent customers who had once been Buick stalwarts. Reuss pushed to transform Buick's increasingly geriatric image, introducing a new line of turbocharged V6 engines (which culminated in the muscular Grand Nationals of the 1980s). He and product planner Jay Qualman also began work on a sporty, two-place Buick, the first Buick two-seater since before the war. It was intended as a statement of intent that Buick was no longer content to be an old man's car. "We wanted an upscale, sportier image," Reuss recalled. "Call it 'sporty elegance.'"
In 1977, there were serious discussions about creating a two-seat "L-body" coupe for Buick and Oldsmobile, based on the upcoming J-body sedans. The L-body project was stillborn, however, when it became clear that to make business sense, the two versions would need a combined annual volume of at least 100,000 units, which was wildly unrealistic. In 1978, Reuss departed to become chief engineer for Chevrolet, and the project collapsed.
They didn't forget about the idea, however, and when Reuss returned to Buick in 1980 as general manager, Jay Qualman -- now product planning chief -- brought up the two-seater idea again. This time, he suggested basing it on the new downsized FWD E-body (Buick Riviera/Cadillac Eldorado/Oldsmobile Toronado), then in development. Qualman and Lynn Salata, Buick's strategic planning manager, concluded that such a car could be profitable at a volume of 22,000 units a year, with very low investment costs.
Reuss pitched the idea to GM president Jim McDonald in the summer of 1981. Proclaiming excitedly, "Finally, someone has figured out how to make money on a two-seater," McDonald declared that the division that really needed a luxury two-seater was Cadillac.
THE PININFARINA PROBLEM
By early 1982, Cadillac had started work on the "Callisto" project, eventually renamed Allanté. Like Reuss's proposed Buick two-seater, it would be based mechanically on the FWD E-body, but it was to be a roadster, aimed directly at the Mercedes SL. To add to its cachet, it was decided early on that the Callisto/Allanté should be styled in Europe, by the prestigious design firm Pininfarina.
That decision did not sit well with Irv Rybicki, Chuck Jordan, or anyone in the Design Staff. They protested angrily, particularly when they learned that Pininfarina would also be contracted to build the bodies, as well as just designing them. "The chief [Cadillac] designer, Wayne Kady, was walking around with a frown," Rybicki recalled. "I thought, win, lose, or draw, I've got to give these fellows a shot at the program, even though the decision might have been made that Pininfarina is going to do it." At his insistence, Design got a few months to put together a competing proposal.
It was a wasted effort. According to Wayne Kady, senior management "looked at ours next to theirs as a courtesy, but they had made up their minds." Rybicki was told, "Irv, regardless of how much better your car may look than the one that Sergio [Pininfarina] is doing, we're going to select his because we believe if it's his design, he'll do a better job of engineering and fabrication and build a quality into it that's necessary."
Read more... (http://ateupwithmotor.com/model-histories/sports-cars-and-muscle-cars/165-legends-of-the-fall-buick-reatta.html/)